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The Battling Buckeyes of the 37th Infantry Division 
 
 On September 3, 1945, Major General Robert Sprague Beightler stood with other 
American commanders at the High Commissioner’s House in Baguio as General Tomoyuki 
Yamashita officially surrendered his forces.1 For Beightler, the surrender was the culmination of 
a military career that began with the Ohio National Guard in 1911. To the GIs of the 37th Infantry 
“Buckeye” Division, Yamashita’s surrender meant the mission was accomplished – the war that 
had devastated the world was over. It was a victory precipitated in part through their four years 
of warfare across the Pacific and meant that their fallen comrades’ sacrifice was not in vain. 
Unfortunately, most of the men who began their journey to war with the division on October 15, 
1940 were no longer present. Only one-third of the soldiers in the division had experienced any 
combat with the unit when it returned to the United States.2 Many had been wounded and 
transferred to other organizations or invalided out of the service. Some had acquired enough 
“points” to rotate home ahead of the division. Others had given their lives in New Georgia, 
Bougainville, and the Philippines. The citizen soldiers of the 37th Infantry “Buckeye” Division 
won their achievements because of a special bond with one another, the National Guard, and the 
state of Ohio.   
The 37th Infantry Division that was forged during the fires of World War I was again 
called upon by its nation after December 7, 1941. It was known as the “Buckeye” Division 
because its original constituents were from the Ohio National Guard. When the 37th Infantry 
                                                          
1 John Kennedy Ohl, Minuteman: The Military Career of General Robert S. Beightler (Boulder: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 2001), 1-2. 
2 37th Division Histories, (N.D.), Robert S. Beightler Papers, Box 1, File 15, Ohio Historical Society (Columbus, 
Ohio), chapter 44, 1.  
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Division arrived in Fiji in 1942 it was made up of 44 percent Ohioans.3 Beightler was proud of 
the division’s Ohio heritage and constantly reminded his men of it. This legacy served as a 
source of pride throughout the grueling Pacific war. As one infantryman described it, “the only 
thing we claim is that we are always conscious that we were carrying the banner for the great 
State of Ohio and if we failed it would be felt in the heart of Ohio and if we succeeded, well, the 
folks back home would be mighty proud.”4 Beightler maintained the division’s bond with its 
Ohio and National Guard origins even as replacements from other states and the Regular Army 
filled the ranks. This bond inspired the division as it left the homeland to fight an enemy that had 
been at war for several years. 
The Buckeyes were a critical component of the American forces that defeated Japan and 
proved the capabilities of National Guard units when properly led. The 37th Infantry Division 
was successful because of Beightler’s leadership and the comradery of the officers and soldiers 
as they overcame tensions between the Regular Army and National Guard while fighting a 
capable foe in the Imperial Japanese Army.  
Federalization and the Road to War 
 On October 15, 1940, Henry L. Stimson, U.S. Secretary of War, officially activated the 
37th Infantry Division into active federal military service.5 The men originally prepared to depart 
for Camp Shelby, Mississippi, under the command Major General Glenson D. Light. General 
Beightler only assumed command of the division after Light failed to pass the new physical tests 
enacted on the guardsmen by the U.S. Army Chief of Staff, General George C. Marshall. John 
                                                          
3 37th Division Histories, Robert S. Beightler Papers, Box 1, File 9, chapter 2, 1. 
4 Ibid., 10.  
5 37th Division Histories, Robert S. Beightler Papers, Box 1, File 10, chapter 3, 1. 
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Bricker, the Governor of Ohio, selected Beightler for the vacancy largely because he knew 
Beightler from his time as Ohio’s chief engineer in the highway department. Additionally, 
Beightler had stellar military experience, was in exceptional physical condition, and was only 
forty-eight years old.  
 Beightler, a Marysville, Ohio native, was a businessman and engineer before 
commanding the 37th Infantry Division. However, his experience as a National Guardsman 
shaped his character and transcended his civilian pursuits. His military experience was earned in 
trial by combat in World War I, his legacy came from his ancestor Commodore Oliver Hazard 
Perry, and his education was both civilian and military – he was an Ohio State University 
graduate and was the top of his Army War College class in 1926.6 Beightler only surpassed his 
passion for the National Guard by his admiration and care for the men who served in the 37th 
Infantry Division.  
 The lengthy journey to Camp Shelby marked the first time below the Mason-Dixon Line 
for many of the men in the division. The Buckeyes arrived only to find the camp in pitiful 
condition. The task to finish the camp was so immense that 10,276 civilian workers were 
employed to aid in completing the facilities.7 Thus the first task at hand for the Buckeyes was not 
to commence training, but to slosh into the thick Mississippi mud in the blazing southern heat 
with axes and shovels to create their new home.  
 The bond between Beightler, also known as Uncle Bob or the solder’s soldier, and his 
men was evident immediately. Beightler did not sit; he spent as much time with his soldiers as 
                                                          
6 Robert S. Beightler Papers, Box 3, File 17, Public Relations Office, feature stories with illustrations, Soldier’s 
Soldier. 
7 37th Division Histories, Robert S. Beightler Papers, Box 1, File 9, chapter 3, 6. 
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possible. Men from an engineer platoon figured this out quickly as they argued who would cross 
a river to retrieve a wire. They then witnessed an officer jump in the water to retrieve it, only to 
be “amazed to see their General climb up on the bank.”8 Beightler maintained a mindset based 
on critically evaluating errors rather than snapping into anger when his men faltered in training. 
He drilled his men constantly and had the highest expectations for them, his main purpose was to 
reduce the number of coffins filled by inadequately trained soldiers. Beightler’s decision to give 
a private an honorable discharge so he could go home to feed his wife and two children rather 
than court martial him for desertion as he snuck away from camp to work a second job embodied 
his compassion for his men. The division chief of staff, Colonel Charles Craig, best summarized 
Beightler: “He’s vitally immersed in every man in this Division.”9 These bonds helped carry the 
37th Infantry Division through the war, but at Camp Shelby they were needed to carry on 
training.  
Beightler’s design to assign selectees to companies based on their hometowns also 
fostered close bonds among the men. His hope was that this policy would build “regimental 
personality out of common experiences and traditions by drawing upon the men’s civilian as well 
as military background.”10 The integration of selectees and replacements proved to be a strength 
of the 37th Infantry Division throughout the war.  
 Once Camp Shelby was suitable for military training, other problems became apparent. 
There was a significant lack of real weaponry, so the men relied on dummy alternatives in their 
initial training. This was especially troublesome for the artillery units because there were only 
                                                          
8 Robert S. Beightler Papers, Box 3, File 17, Public Relations Office, feature stories with illustrations, Soldier’s 
Soldier.  
9 Ibid. 
10 37th Division Histories, Robert S. Beightler Papers, Box 1, File 10, chapter 4, 7. 
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four 75mm cannons and twelve 37mm anti-tank guns available, along with a few dozen 
mortars.11 Beightler continued their training regardless and instilled discipline and pride in his 
citizen soldiers. The strong performance of the 37th in its training was best exemplified by the 
fact that in mid-January 1941 Major General Campbell Hodges, Commanding General 5 th Corps 
Area, and Lieutenant General Herbert Bress, Commander 3rd Army, allowed the 37th Infantry 
Division to progress to a new stage in their training.12 This achievement was a relatively rare 
occurrence among the newly federalized National Guard Units, most of which had to repeat the 
thirteen week basic training program.13 In late January 1941 the first draftees were assigned to 
the 37th Infantry Division, the product of the first peacetime draft ever instituted in the United 
States.  
The pace of training increased in June with large maneuvers conducted with the 38th 
Infantry “Cyclone” Division.  These larger maneuvers provided officers with valuable field 
command experience that emphasized effective communication and coordination. The constant 
rain that accompanied these maneuvers turned the Mississippi mud into ubiquitous ooze. As 
Technical Sergeant Charles Joe observed, “I know a lot of guys who started growing webs 
between their toes.”14 These dismal conditions offered the GIs a small preview of what war in 
the Pacific would entail. Buckeye veterans recalled after the war that “New Georgia, of course, 
was worse, but at the time we never thought that we would see anything as bad as that damn 
brown mud of Louisiana.”15  
                                                          
11 37th Division Histories, Robert S. Beightler Papers, Box 1, File 9, chapter 3, 13. 
12 Ibid., 16. 
13 One especially successful element of the division was the 112th Engineer Battalion, which at one point constructed 
a 279 foot bridge in only eleven minutes. However, the 112th was reassigned to the 34th Infantry Division when the 
war began and was destined to fight in Europe.13 Fortunately for the Buckeyes, the 117th Engineer Battalion, 
attached in June 1942, proved to be an adequate replacement.  
14 37th Division Histories, Robert S. Beightler Papers, Box 1, File 10, chapter 5, 4.  
15 Ibid., 6.   
Webb 7 
 
 July 1941 witnessed a significant influx of real weaponry into the 37th Infantry Division, 
including 105mm howitzers, machine guns, small arms, tanks, and a significant number of tank 
destroyers.  The training pace of U.S. forces increased after more divisions completed basic 
training and became ready for corps and army level maneuvers. Throughout August and 
September 1941, 555,000 personnel from the Second and Third Armies assembled in Gillis, 
Louisiana, for large-scale maneuvers. The high point of the exercise for the 37th Infantry 
Division, part of the Third Army, was when the 112th Engineer Battalion fixed an impassable 
road leading to the capture of 500 vehicles and the severing of the opposition forces’ supply 
line.16 These maneuvers gave the men some practical experience in field operations and allowed 
them to realize their capabilities to endure hardships and succeed. Beightler was very critical of 
any mistakes he found in his division’s performance, errors ranging from salutes and uniforms to 
maneuvers and artillery precision. He believed every member of the division, no matter how 
experienced, should constantly seek improvement. He held his officers to an even higher 
standard, which was reflected in his remarks to them that “for it would be a tragedy indeed, and a 
betrayal of the sacrifice these men are making, to fail them now.”17  
Long marches, terrible weather, and the looming end of the one-year mobilization period 
in October took their toll on morale as men began to wonder why they were doing all of this 
training for a war that was half a world away. The slogan “OHIO,” or Over the Hill in October, 
became common, although the division veterans claim they did not create the phrase. When 
Beightler was asked about the division’s morale he responded “Morale! Look here, when you 
know you’re in the best damn division in the army… well, then you’ve got morale.”18 Despite 
                                                          
16 37th Division Histories, Robert S. Beightler Papers, Box 1, File 10, chapter 7, 1.  
17 Robert S. Beightler Papers, Box 1, File, 6, Post-Maneuver Evaluation.  
18 Robert S. Beightler Papers, Box 3, File 17, Public Relations Office, feature stories with illustrations Soldier’s 
Soldier. 
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these conditions, Beightler continued to challenge his men and thrust them from the world of 
civilians into that of soldiers, all while forging his own bond with the division.  
The National Guardsmen would not go home in October. The War Department instead 
enacted an eighteen-month extension, which became indefinite once the nation was at war. The 
War Department also enacted new age restrictions for officers, which resulted in the dismissal or 
retirement of thirty-four officers in the division. Beightler emphasized specialized training in 
intelligence, anti-tank defense, and other areas. The men would need the training, for 
unbeknownst to them, the United States would soon be at war.  
On December 7, 1941, Camp Shelby was essentially deserted, with most men on 
extended furlough for the Christmas holidays. As radio reports of the Japanese attack on Pearl 
Harbor filled the airwaves, men were immediately recalled. U.S. and Japanese forces were 
already fighting half a world away when President Franklin Delano Roosevelt requested a 
declaration of war against Imperial Japan on December 8, and Germany declared war several 
days later on the United States. As the men digested this new reality, their new obsession became 
figuring out where they would be deployed. The reality of war only made Beightler, a World 
War I veteran, more concerned. He stated: “This Division is good but it is not good enough for 
what faces us.”19 What faced the 37th Infantry Division was a world war that the Allies were 
losing. In the Pacific the Japanese captured Singapore and assaulted the Gilbert, Marshall, and 
Philippine Islands, while Rommel’s Africa Corps was pushing British forces back in Libya and 
Egypt and the Germans were at the gates of Moscow.  
                                                          
19 Robert S. Beightler Papers, Box 1, File 6, Talk to Officers and NCOs on December 9, 1941. 
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By the time the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, the 37th Infantry Division had been 
training for approximately one year, having been activated on October 15, 1940 in the wake of 
the national security crisis occasioned by the fall of France. The division performed well in this 
training; however, this single year could not provide a comparable experience to that of the 
battle-tested Imperial Japanese Army. Most of the forces facing the Buckeyes had fought in 
Japan’s aggressive military expansion as it attempted to create a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity 
Sphere. Some of the most notable adversaries were the 6th Infantry Division on Bougainville, 
responsible for the Nanking Massacre, and General Yamashita. Yamashita, who would command 
the 14th Area Army on Luzon during the U.S. invasion of the Philippines, earned the title of 
“Tiger of Malaya” for his crushing defeat of Allied, principally British and Indian, forces in 
Malaya and Singapore in 1942.20 However, Beightler was an exceptional commander in his own 
right, one who prepared his men for the imposing task ahead and selected capable officers to lead 
them.  
The 37th Infantry Division was originally supposed to be part of a force to relieve U.S. 
forces in the Philippines. This plan was quickly discarded because it was simply impractical 
based on the situation – just as War Plan Orange designers feared.21 Rumors surged in the 
division that they were to be sent to Ireland. Instead, the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided the 37th 
Infantry Division would fight its battles in the Pacific after the Arcadia Conference in early 
January 1942. Japan was rapidly progressing southward, capturing the Solomon Islands and 
enhancing the threat to New Zealand and Australia. The 147th Infantry Regiment was detached 
from the 37th Infantry Division and sent to Tonga, an island on the southeastern coast of Fiji. 
                                                          
20 Murray, Williamson, and Allan, Millet.  A War to be Won: Fighting the Second World War. Cambridge, MA: 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2001. (173) 
21 Miller, Edward S. War Plan Orange: the US strategy to defeat Japan, 1897-1945. Annapolis: Md., 2007. (53-54) 
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Thus the recently triangularized22 37th Infantry Division, as of January 16, was left with only two 
infantry regiments.23 It was not until after the division’s combat on New Georgia that it received 
a replacement, the 129th Infantry Regiment. Nevertheless, the Buckeyes departed on May 26, 
1942, from San Francisco for Fiji as part of Task Force 6429.24  
The Joint Chiefs of Staff deemed Fiji a point at which the Japanese advance must be 
halted. If Fiji fell then American ability to retaliate and effectively ship supplies and troops to 
Australia and New Zealand would have been greatly compromised. The main island in Fiji, Viti 
Levu, was where most of the division resided in 1942. The elements of the division that landed 
on New Zealand assisted in training the New Zealand Home Units, guarded important areas, and 
manned defensive positions. The occupation of Fiji was more intensive because the island lacked 
a significant defensive infrastructure. In the event of Japanese attack the division was ordered to 
hold Fiji at all costs.  
Beightler used the ten months on Fiji and New Zealand to conduct training in Pacific 
conditions focused on combating Japanese tactics. Fiji had a diverse geography with features 
ranging from mangrove swamps to rainforests, harboring all of the many discomforts of the 
tropical battlefields to come. Additionally, the division spent significant time interacting with Fiji 
natives, who provided the soldiers with lessons of jungle survival and a bond to Fijians who 
helped them fight in the Solomon Islands campaign. Fijians served in many capacities with the 
37th Infantry Division throughout Operation Cartwheel, the Solomon’s campaign. However, the 
training on Fiji did not provide a skilled foe to provide the GIs with actual combat experience. 
                                                          
22 Prior to World War II, U.S. divisions were of a square configuration with four infantry regiments. Early in the war 
the infantry division structure was altered to a “triangle” structure with three infantry regiments and a general overall 
restructuring. The purpose was to create a more mobile force compared to that of a square division.  
23 Robert S. Beightler Papers, Box 5, File 2, General Orders, 1941-1945, January 31, 1942, General Order No. 2. 
24 37th Division Histories, Robert S. Beightler Papers, Box 1, File 11, chapter 10, 11.  
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The division history recalls that “there were no Japs (sic) on Fiji, and no large American 
cemeteries where the 37th bade goodbyes to its buddies.”25 
The next stop for the 37th Infantry Division was Guadalcanal, which had been seized after 
a fierce campaign that began on August 7, 1942. Although the Japanese ground forces on 
Guadalcanal had been defeated, the war was closer now than ever to the Buckeyes. This reality 
became evident on their first night ashore, when five Japanese planes bombarded Henderson 
Airfield. The danger was minimal, no casualties were suffered, but the NCOs had to jokingly tell 
their men digging their foxholes too deep that “one more shovelful and you’re AWOL.”26 
Beightler combated the disparity in experience through constant training whenever possible prior 
to the division’s first combat action in New Georgia. The close proximity to combat operations 
meant that there was now an incredible amount of supplies available to the 37th. Beightler 
utilized the immense amount of shells to endlessly drill his artillery battalions. He also focused 
training on small unit tactics, landing operations, and beachhead establishment. Just as on Fiji, 
the 37th Infantry Division on Guadalcanal did not contact Japanese forces and thus remained an 
untested division. This was about to change.  
 Following the U.S. success at the Battle of Midway, Major General Richard Sutherland, 
General MacArthur’s chief of staff, put forth MacArthur’s plan to seize Rabaul. This plan was 
ultimately the final phase of a Joint Chiefs of Staff directive—Operation CARTWHEEL—that 
also entailed offensives against portions of New Guinea and up the Solomon Islands chain. 
Rabaul was a major Japanese base located on the island of New Britain. 27 The first steps toward 
seizing this redoubt were complete after the victories on Guadalcanal and Tulagi in the Solomon 
                                                          
25 37th Division Histories, Robert S. Beightler Papers, Box 1, File 10, chapter 12, 39. 
26 Ibid., chapter 13, 9.  
27 Spector, Ronald H. Eagle Against the Sun: the American War with Japan. Riverside: Free Press, 2012, 185-188. 
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Islands, but the island still remained out of range of American land-based airpower. MacArthur’s 
plan consisted of several phases, beginning with the establishment of airfields on New Georgia. 
The training that began at Camp Shelby, where Beightler set high standards for his soldiers, 
would soon be tested.  
New Georgia: Welcome to War 
 The island of New Georgia consisted of dense jungles, overgrowth, and thick mud similar 
to that of Camp Shelby. New Georgia, in the scheme of Operation CARTWHEEL, was 
important because it was the prerequisite to the seizure of Bougainville, which would then put 
American aircraft within range of Rabaul. Admiral William Halsey led the invasion of New 
Georgia, with the primary objective the seizure of Munda Airfield.28 The Japanese 38th Infantry 
Division, as well as other smaller units, awaited the Americans on New Georgia.29 The action of 
the 37th Infantry Division on New Georgia consisted of two separate operations. The first of 
these entailed the attachment of two battalions from the 145th and 148th Infantry Regiments to the 
1st Marine Raider Battalion at Rice Anchorage. The second operation, the main one, occurred 
when the 37th was pulled from reserve to assist the 43rd Infantry Division at Zanana Beach.30  
                                                          
28 Ibid., 233. 
29 37th Division Histories, Robert S. Beightler Papers, Box 1, File 11, chapter 16, 80. 
30 37th Division Histories, Robert S. Beightler Papers, Box 1, File 10, chapter 14, pages 1-3. 
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The Solomon Islands (Rabaul is on the eastern coast of New Britain)31 
                                                          
31 Major John Rentz, “Solomon Islands Geography,” HyperWar: USMC Monograph--Marines in the Central 
Solomons. Accessed February 13, 2018. 
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The Invasion of New Georgia: Operation Toenails32  
 The role of the landing force at Rice Anchorage was to prevent the landing of Japanese 
reinforcements, thereby isolating Japanese forces on New Georgia. This strategy was adopted 
because of the American experience on Guadalcanal, where the Japanese were able to reinforce 
                                                          
32 John Miller, “TOENAILS: The Landings in New Georgia.” HyperWar: US Army in WWII: CARTWHEEL--The 
Reduction of Rabaul. Accessed February 13, 2018. 
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their garrison with two divisions during the course of the fighting.33 The objectives for this task 
force were to secure Rice Anchorage and Enogai Inlet, to establish blockades along the Munda-
Bairoko trail, and eventually to seize Bairoko Harbor. The Munda-Bairoko trail was the artery 
that allowed for the Japanese to move troops and supplies around New Georgia. The American 
force, under the command of Marine Colonel Harry Liversedge, landed at Rice Anchorage in 
Kula Gulf on July 5, 1943, under a flurry of Japanese artillery fire. Thus elements of the 37 th 
Infantry Division entered combat for the first time in the absence of Major General Beightler. 
This action displayed the effectiveness of the training Beightler put his men through and that the 
National Guard forces were capable of facing up to the more battle-tested Japanese.  
 The Marines and Guardsmen were able to advance relatively quickly because the 
Japanese had positioned the majority of their defensive positions south of Rice Anchorage. 
Difficulties still emerged as Company L and several platoons from the 3rd Battalion, 148th 
Infantry Regiment landed 3000 yards off-target to the south.34 The scattered force proceeded 
through enemy lines for two days before reaching Rice Anchorage. Colonel Liversedge assigned 
the 1st Marine Raider Battalion and Companies K and L from the 145th Infantry Regiment to take 
Enogai Inlet, the remainder of the regiment to secure Rice Anchorage, and the 3rd Battalion, 
148th Infantry to establish roadblocks on the Munda-Bairoko junction and Rice Anchorage-
Munda trails.35 These roadblocks were critical because they forced the Japanese to use water 
routes for supply and troop movement, thus exposing them to American air and naval firepower. 
A few days after landing a patrol from the 148th Infantry Regiment killed two Japanese soldiers 
near the Little Bairoko River. The Buckeye Division was now officially in the war. 
                                                          
33 37th Division Histories, Robert S. Beightler Papers, Box 1, File 11, chapter 15, 1.  
34 Ibid., 3. 
35 Ibid., 5. 
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 The 148th Infantry Regiment established a roadblock without contest from the Japanese, 
who were completely surprised after an entire food supply mission was destroyed when it ran 
into the American position. However, once the blockade was discovered the Japanese 
immediately set out to destroy it and inflicted the first combat casualty on a soldier in the 37th 
Infantry Division. Private William Kuckne, Company I, provided covering fire for the other 
eleven men from their forward outpost to retreat back to the main roadblock. When American 
forces reclaimed the outpost two days later they found Kuckne among four slain Japanese 
soldiers.36 A major banzai attack by the Japanese on July 10 managed to reach the 3rd Battalion’s 
command post, but a counterattack led by Captain Vernon McMillian pushed the Japanese 
back.37 Throughout the action New Georgians and Fijians evacuated twenty-eight wounded 
Americans. The island natives and Fijians greatly assisted the 37th Infantry Division through 
their service as guides, supply runners, stretcher bearers, and more. 
The situation at the roadblock became dire as increasing casualties were combined with 
depleted food stores and medical units ran out of supplies to treat the wounded. The position 
became known to the Buckeyes as “Starvation Ridge,” with rations down to one-eighteenth of a 
K-ration by July 14.38 Back at Rice Anchorage, the 145th Infantry was not faring much better 
because of Japanese artillery and A6M “Zeros” from Munda Airfield constantly pounded its 
positions. Luckily for the Americans the Marine Raiders and Companies K and L of the 145th 
Infantry Regiment were making progress in their push on Enogai Inlet. They captured the village 
of Triri, a fortified Japanese position. Captain Clifford Morrow received a Silver Star for 
                                                          
36 Ibid., 8. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid., 12.  
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exposing himself to enemy fire to retrieve the wounded commander of Company K and a marine 
officer.39  
After seizing the village, Liversedge withdrew his forces from the Munda-Bairoko 
roadblock because of significant supply shortages. Several attempts were made to advance on 
Bairoko Harbor, but the Japanese defense inflicted severe enough losses that the Americans had 
to be content with a defensive posture and the reestablishment of the roadblock.40 Welcome news 
of the seizure of Munda Airfield, the task of the remainder of the 37th Infantry Division, reached 
the Rice Anchorage force, and they then assaulted Bairoko Harbor, only to find the Japanese had 
abandoned it.  
 While the force at Rice Anchorage performed its duties, the majority of the 37th Infantry 
Division was pulled from reserve by Major General Oscar Griswold, Commander of XIV Corps, 
shortly after the battle commenced. The 43rd Infantry Division found itself on a vulnerable 4,000 
yard front extending from the Zanana landing site.41 The 43rd Infantry Division, a New England 
National Guard division, had difficulties when it entered combat and failed to take Munda 
Airfield. Additionally, the division faltered in its defense of the Kokorana area. General 
Griswold stated that the division seemed as though it was “about to fold up” as battle fatigue 
took more of a toll than physical wounds.42 The 169th Infantry Regiment suffered severe 
casualties and was relieved by the Buckeye 145th Infantry Regiment, minus its 3rd Battalion with 
the marines at Rice Anchorage. Colonel Temple G. Holland, commanding officer of the 145th 
Infantry Regiment, also became the commander of the remnants of the 169th Infantry Regiment. 
                                                          
39 Ibid., 10.  
40 Ibid., 14. 
41 37th Division Histories, Robert S. Beightler Papers, Box 1, File 12, chapter 16, pages 4-7. 
42 Eagle Against the Sun, 236.  
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The soldiers of the 145th Infantry Regiment discovered a pitiful situation upon contacting the 
169th Infantry Regiment. Enemy infiltrations and roadblocks were ubiquitous, and elements of 
the 118th Medical Battalion with their casualties were surrounded at the Barike River. A breakout 
was successful, but when the position was retaken several days later the GIs discovered the 
tortured corpses of those Americans who did not survive the retreat. This infuriated the 
Buckeyes, and one infantryman stated that “No holds were barred.” “All was fair” was his brief 
(and accurate) assessment of the Pacific War.43  
 The artillery of the 37th Infantry Division performed well on July 17 when the Japanese 
threatened to overrun the supply depot for the 145th Infantry Regiment and elements of the 43rd 
Infantry Division. The 136th Field Artillery maintained its shelling throughout the night, which 
led Brigadier General Barker, commanding the 43rd Division Artillery, to visit the unit and 
personally thank them for “saving his life.”44 Despite the artillery fire, the Japanese maintained 
constant pressure on the supply positions of the American forces and inflicted significant 
casualties.  
 The bulk of the 148th Infantry Regiment, commanded by Colonel Stuart Baxter, landed at 
Zanana Beach where rows of wounded GIs welcomed them to the war. The regiment advanced 
to relieve the northern flank of the 169th Infantry Regiment, but the defensive line was so porous 
that the Japanese easily infiltrated the American positions. The Japanese inserted small forces 
that ambushed the GIs with sniper rifles and Nambu machine guns. In one instance the majority 
of a company of mortar-men were killed; in another a regimental supply dump lost a significant 
amount of supplies.45 Major General Beightler assumed command during this debacle and 
                                                          
43 37th Division Histories, Robert S. Beightler Papers, Box 1, File 11, chapter 15, 11.  
44 Ibid., chapter 16, 13. 
45 Ibid., 55. 
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immediately sought to solidify his lines. He positioned his four field artillery battalions on the 
adjacent islands of Roviana and Sasavale.46 He also sought to withdraw his forces from forward 
positons to shorten the lengthy American perimeter.  
Colonel Baxter disobeyed Beightler’s command by pushing his men beyond the 
designated perimeter. This put his entire regiment out of position and created a salient in the 
American line. The Japanese exploited the gap and 200 Japanese soldiers infiltrated into the 
148th Infantry Regiment’s lines.47  Beightler emphasized that his regiments must tie in their 
flanks and was infuriated when Baxter lost contact with the 161st Infantry Regiment. The bravery 
of Baxter’s men was the only solution to his poor decision-making. On July 31, 1943, Private 
Rodger Young, Company B, 148th Infantry Regiment, saved his pinned comrades.48 A Japanese 
machine gun slowed the advance of Companies G and B and immobilized Young’s platoon. As 
day faded into night Young decided to take action. He exposed himself to advance on the enemy 
position and was hit by two bursts of machine gun fire. He then stood up, completely exposing 
himself, and threw his grenades into the Japanese position as a final burst killed him. Young’s 
bravery allowed his comrades to withdraw into the safety of American lines. His actions were 
immortalized in song and his sacrifice earned him the Medal of Honor. The ballad proudly 
relates: “No, they've got no time for glory in the Infantry, no they've got no use for praises loudly 
sung, but in every soldier's heart in all the Infantry, shines the name, shines the name of Rodger 
Young.”49 Young’s actions were the inspiration for the name of a troop transport in Robert 
Heinlein’s acclaimed science fiction novel Starship Troopers.  
                                                          
46 Ibid., 25. 
47 Minuteman: The Military Career of General Robert S. Beightler, 115. 
48 Robert S. Beightler Papers, Box 5, File 12, Awards, Medal of Honor Citations, 1943-1946, Official Medal of 
Honor Citation for Private Rodger W. Young.  
49 “Loesser writes for Infantry,” LIFE magazine, March 5, 1945, 117.  
Webb 20 
 
The Americans eventually reconsolidated their lines. After the battle Beightler relieved 
Baxter of his command; however, Beightler had several other problems to solve as well.  
Untested artillery forward observers struggled to distinguish targets in the dense overgrowth and 
the topographical maps of the area were unreliable at best. Additionally, Japanese commanders 
quickly realized they lacked sufficient artillery to confront American counter-battery fire. Once 
the American artillery commenced its shelling, the Japanese fired sporadically into American 
lines. The Americans occasionally called off their artillery because they believed they were firing 
short and inflicting friendly casualties.50 Nevertheless, the 37th Infantry Division commenced its 
first major offensive against Bibolo Hill on August 2, the last high ground before reaching 
Munda Airfield. The 43rd Infantry Division attacked the left flank of the hill while the 37th 
Infantry Division was tasked with attacking the right flank. Beightler used the 148th Infantry 
Regiment to guard his northern flank while the 161st Infantry Regiment engaged the Japanese 
pillboxes. When progress slowed, Beightler called on his artillery and naval guns to eliminate 
enemy positions and displayed his belief (and American tactical practice) in using massive 
firepower before he risked the lives of his men. With Bibolo Hill secured, the primary objective 
of Munda Airfield was now becoming increasingly vulnerable. 
The Americans found that the most significant obstacle in seizing Munda Airfield was an 
elevated area known as Horseshoe Hill, which was preventing advances from the east of the 
airfield. Beightler subsequently tasked Colonel Temple Holland’s 145th Infantry Regiment to 
take it. A well dug-in Japanese battalion with interlocking fields of fire on the high ground 
awaited them. Progress was slow, costly, and often only came from the sacrifice of a lone 
infantrymen with a flamethrower or explosives. Vicious hand-to-hand combat occurred 
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frequently in the desperate struggle to hold any ground taken against determined Japanese 
counterattacks. The 145th Infantry Regiment seized a significant portion of Horseshoe Hill by 
July 28, when the 2nd Battalion was dug in only 35 yards from the Japanese fortifications. The 
price for this progress—178 killed and wounded—was high, forcing Beightler to reinforce the 
fighting with elements of the 148th Infantry Regiment.  
On the evening of July 31, Beightler decided that Horseshoe Hill was weak enough to 
launch a final assault. His exhausted men were short on water and casualties were climbing. The 
previous day the Japanese launched a major banzai attack in an attempt to retake the hill, but 
suffered severe casualties and were forced to withdraw. The following morning the GIs formed a 
skirmish line, lobbed several grenades, and commenced a bayonet charge against the remainder 
of the Japanese soldiers. The division suffered 128 wounded but finally seized the hill. The 
Japanese began their retreat only to find that the Munda-Bairoko trail was blocked by the 1st 
Marine Raider Battalion and battalions from the 145th Infantry Regiment and 148th Infantry 
Regiment. With the fall of Horseshoe Hill the Japanese essentially lost Munda Airfield. For the 
Buckeye Division, the battle resulted in more than 200 killed and 1,000 wounded.51 
On July 25 the 5 inch guns of destroyers offshore and bombs from B-24 Liberators 
pummeled Japanese defenses on the airfield. However, the GIs quickly learned that a thorough 
preemptive bombardment does not result in the complete destruction of the enemy. The 145 th 
Infantry Regiment and 161st Infantry Regiment moved rapidly in the initial assault but were soon 
pinned down by stout Japanese fortifications. Several tanks and specialty weapons such as 
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flamethrowers destroyed fourteen Japanese pillboxes.52 The airfield fell with relative ease after 
the pillboxes were silenced.  
The effects of combat were molding the citizen soldiers of the 37th Infantry Division into 
experienced veterans. The GIs no longer “talked, laughed, or made any variety of noise” at night, 
and several men began to suffer from traumatic nightmares as casualties mounted.53 The 117th 
Engineer Battalion was especially prone to high casualties because the bulldozers at this point in 
the war offered no protection and the Japanese specifically targeted them to delay American 
advances. The engineers were aware of their vulnerability but carried out their duty to clear 
jungle paths for supply columns and other traffic. A letter from an engineer officer to a family 
that lost their son while he was operating a bulldozer read: “The dozer (sic) made enough noise 
to bring the Jap (sic) army to his scene of operations. And he knew it, but kept on pushing the 
jungles back, yard by yard.”54  
  On August 13 the Buckeyes witnessed the rewarding sight of American aircraft landing 
on Munda Airfield, while the 117th Engineer Battalion created roadways and buildings. This step 
to Rabaul was complete; the New Georgia garrison was beaten. The division was reorganized at 
the conclusion of the campaign. The 161st Infantry Regiment was detached from the 37th Infantry 
Division and the 129th Infantry Regiment was assigned in its place for the duration of the war.  
 The officers Beightler had selected proved to be mostly capable. Beightler’s confidence 
in them was reflected in his remark before the battle that “it takes a lot of hard work and weeding 
out of inferior officers [to get a division ready for combat] but the job has now been 
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accomplished.”55 However, Beightler was faced with the challenge of resolving command issues, 
with the most important being the need to replace Colonel Baxter. Beightler choose Colonel 
Lawrence White to take command of the 148th Infantry Regiment. White was a 1933 West Point 
graduate, an experienced regimental commander, and had served in Beightler’s G-3 section 
during the battle.56 White’s appointment reflected Beightler’s desire to have competent leaders 
above all else, even if it meant disregarding the lack of Ohio and National Guard roots. However, 
he maintained the division’s Ohio heritage with the appointment of Colonel Cecil Whitcomb as 
the new commander of the 145th Infantry Regiment. Major General Griswold had pulled the 
regiment’s previous commander, Colonel Temple Holland, and sent him to take command of the 
169th Infantry Regiment of the 43rd Infantry Division. Whitcomb was a World War I veteran and 
a member of the Ohio National Guard since 1922.  
Beightler also displayed an ability to quell tensions between the Regular Army and the 
National Guard during the New Georgia campaign. The first encounter arose when Major 
General Joseph Collins, commanding the 25th Infantry Division, attempted to micromanage the 
37th Infantry Division. Collins, a West Point graduate, was not in favor of National Guard 
officers commanding divisions. This sentiment was shared by Brigadier General Charles Craig, 
the 37th Assistant Division Commander and a Regular Army veteran, who vocalized his belief 
that Guardsmen should be content with battalion command. However, Beightler appreciated 
Craig’s talent and willingness to critically analyze situations. After Beightler confronted him 
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Craig improved his attitude and served with Beightler throughout the war. Beightler eventually 
recommended Craig’s promotion to major general.57  
A critical component of the 37th Infantry Division’s victory on New Georgia was the 
performance of its auxiliary units. The engineer, medical, signal, and other outfits performed 
well under fire. The 117th Engineer Battalion kept the jungle at bay while signal units kept 
communications flowing. Two examples of the performance of the 112th Medical Battalion come 
from the surgeons and a regimental dentist. Surgeons operated constantly to attempt to save 
wounded GIs. Their dedication was observed even during air raids in which “all but surgeons 
find shelter.”58 Captain William Welker, a Regimental Dentist, reacted calmly to two Japanese 
mortar shells that failed to explode while he was performing surgery with the remark “damn poor 
workmanship.”59 Additionally, the 37th Infantry Division had a very low rate of malaria as the 
disease, along with a multitude of other ailments, ravaged American divisions across the pacific. 
Ultimately the Buckeyes had one of the lowest malaria rates of any division in the Pacific; 
illnesses rarely exceeded 0.3 to 0.4 percent of the division.60 This shows the leadership and 
discipline of the organization, as preventing malarial outbreaks was a function of ensuring 
soldiers took their Atabrine tablets, a prophylactic drug that targets malarial parasites. This was 
easier said than done, as untrue rumors swept the GI ranks in the Southwest Pacific that the drug 
made one impotent. 
The 37th Infantry Division demonstrated exceptional combat effectiveness for a 
completely untested organization. Its performance helped salvage the reputation of the National 
                                                          
57 Robert S. Beightler Papers, Box 5, File 19, Efficiency Reports (promotions), July 1943-August 1945, Promotion 
of Charles Chair and Leo Kreber.  
58 Ibid., 49. 
59 Ibid., 58.  
60 37th Division Histories, Robert S. Beightler Papers, Box 1, File 10, chapter 13, 10. 
Webb 25 
 
Guard on New Georgia after the 43rd Infantry Division had faltered. The 37th Infantry Division 
received high praise from a number of senior commanders and Beightler earned a Distinguished 
Service Medal for his actions as well. The soldiers were supposed to receive rest, but Major 
General Millard Harmon, the Commanding General of U.S. Army Forces in the South Pacific 
Area, had other plans for the division, which he described in a letter to Beightler: “Now with but 
a short breather you go into another operation. Your division was chosen for this task partly 
because of its availability but largely because of its demonstrated effectiveness in New Georgia. 
I recently noted the mental and physical preparedness of the personnel of all echelons to 
undertake this new task.”61 The GIs of the 37th Infantry Division prepared to again enter the fray.  
Bougainville: Onward to Rabaul 
 After seizing New Georgia, the U.S. military now had land-based aircraft within range of 
Bougainville, the next target in Operation CARTWHEEL. Admiral Halsey, commander of the 
South Pacific Area, assumed command of the Bougainville operation. The premise of the 
operation was for an amphibious force to land at Cape Torokina in Empress Augusta Bay and to 
establish a perimeter for the construction of airfields.62 Admiral Halsey originally intended to use 
the 25th Infantry Division. However, that division was depleted from combat on Guadalcanal and 
New Georgia, which resulted in the 37th Infantry Division taking its place.63  
 The American strategy never entailed seizing all of Bougainville. The Japanese 
Seventeenth Army, commanded by Lieutenant General Haruyoshi Hyakutake, consisted of 
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approximately 37,500 soldiers.64 The vast majority of these forces were concentrated towards the 
southern tip of Bougainville because the Japanese deemed that location to be the most probable 
site for an American amphibious landing. Instead, Halsey had the 3rd Marine Division spearhead 
the assault at Empress Augusta Bay. This site was geographically less favorable than the 
southern portion of the island; however, it was comparatively more weakly held. The Terokina 
Guard Unit consisted of only 500-700 soldiers and lacked substantial fortifications.65  
 The Marines commenced the assault on November 1, 1943, after an intensive pre-
invasion naval and aerial bombardment. The 148th Infantry Regiment was attached to the 3rd 
Marine Division the following day, and essentially all of the 37th Infantry Division was on 
Bougainville by November 19.66 The first encounter the GIs of the 37th Infantry Division had 
with the Japanese on Bougainville was on November 9 when a patrol from the 148th Infantry 
Regiment encountered a Japanese suicide battalion.67 The division took up position in the 
western part of the beachhead, began to expand the perimeter, and awaited the inevitable 
Japanese counterattack.  
 The 37th Reconnaissance Troop completed the important task of long range patrols during 
the initial phase of the Bougainville operation by extensively mapping the poorly known terrain. 
On one patrol the 3rd Platoon encountered three heavy Japanese machine guns and sporadic 
mortar fire as they reached the top of a plateaued area. Heavily outnumbered, the GIs held out 
for three hours until reinforced by the remainder of the troop.68 Their intelligence proved to be 
critically important to the eventual American defense of Hill 700 by providing artillery battalions 
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with improved knowledge of the terrain. The 37th Reconnaissance Troop was later awarded the 
Presidential Unit Citation for mapping 270 miles of jungle trail up to 25 miles behind Japanese 
lines on Bougainville.69  
Japanese resistance was relatively light throughout the month, and by November 25 the 
airfields were under construction. The division’s artillery battalions provided direct, neutralizing, 
and counter-battery fire for the 3rd Marine Division, which was encountering stronger 
resistance.70 During this relatively light period of action, the Buckeyes learned valuable lessons 
from Fijians assisting them on the island. The Fijian remedy for the painful bug bites was to open 
a small wound with a machete and simply pour water down the blade.71 Apparently, this was 
more effective than any treatment the medics could offer the soldiers. It was also during this time 
that the 117th Engineer Battalion constructed numerous bridges and roads that were essential to 
the division’s success in the upcoming action. From November 1943 to February 1944, the 37th 
Infantry Division encountered only sporadic resistance on the ground. The most significant 
nuisance was Japanese air raids launched from Rabaul. Although these raids were ineffective 
they were numerous; in the first week of December there were eighty-eight air raids.72 However, 
by early January 1944 the defensive perimeter was mostly complete, with 14,000 yards defended 
by the Buckeye Division.73 The GIs continued digging in, especially since intelligence reports in 
late February provided evidence that a major Japanese attack was forming.  
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 Evidence of an impending Japanese attack became increasingly apparent. In late February 
the U.S. Navy intercepted a Japanese radio message that detailed a large scale attack was to be 
conducted around March 6.74 Additionally, there was increased contact with reinforced Japanese 
patrols, and artillery reconnaissance planes noted the massing of Japanese forces. The most 
crucial intelligence came from prisoners of war, who confirmed the Japanese would attack in 
early March.75 The 13th Infantry Regiment was to attack Hill 260 at the front of the Americal 
Division sector, while the 23rd Infantry Regiment was to attack the high ground near Blue Ridge 
as a diversionary attack.76 The main effort was believed to be an assault from the 45th Infantry 
Regiment against the 129th Infantry Regiment’s perimeter along the Numa-Numa trail.77 
However, it readily became apparent that the Japanese were to concentrate on seizing Hill 700 
and Cannon Hill.  
 Hill 700 was the lynchpin of the American perimeter and strongpoint of the 145th Infantry 
Regiment. It was an elevated area in the center of the defensive line that overlooked the new 
airfield. Beightler understood the importance of this area and ordered a large number of heavy 
artillery pieces to cover Hill 700.78 However, he was not entirely convinced the Japanese would 
focus their attack on it because of the formidable steepness and dense overgrowth. The crack 
Japanese 6th Infantry Division, responsible for the massacre at Nanking, led the attack against 
Hill 700. The Japanese command was so sure of victory that they had already planned where 
Major General Griswold, commander of XIV Corps, would surrender. General Hyakutake’s 
fanatical troops were sent off with a speech that began: “The time has come to manifest our 
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knighthood with the pure brilliance of the sword. It is our duty to erase the mortification of our 
brothers at Guadalcanal. Attack. Assault. Destroy Everything. Cut, slash, and mow them 
down.”79 It was with this setting that battle was joined between the 37th Infantry Division and the 
Japanese on Bougainville in what was one of the bloodiest engagements of the South Pacific 
War. On a small beachhead on Bougainville the farmers, schoolboys, and shopkeepers of the 
Buckeye Division engaged some of the most capable troops in the Imperial Japanese Army, who 
had been waging war for nearly a decade.  
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Japanese Counterattack and American Disposition80 
 At dawn on March 8, 1944, Japanese artillery shells began falling on Hill 700. Beightler 
ordered the guns of six field artillery battalions to respond as the last American patrols were 
withdrawn into the defensive perimeter. The barrage inflicted severe casualties on the advancing 
Japanese, at least until they advanced close enough to American lines to force the artillery to lift 
for fear of causing friendly casualties. The Japanese next encountered the ingenious idea of Staff 
Sergeant Otis Hawkins. Hawkins created a device that set fuel buckets ablaze with phosphorus 
grenades once Japanese soldiers began to cut the barbed wire in front of the American positions. 
The blazes lit up the battlefield, increasing the accuracy of hundreds of 60mm mortar rounds and 
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American small arms fire.81 The assault failed. The Japanese resumed their advance on March 9 
and a Japanese battalion breached the outermost perimeter to penetrate into the American line.82  
However, their progress came at a high price as the men of the 145th Infantry Regiment refused 
to retreat from their positions. Beightler immediately dispatched the 1st Battalion of the 145th 
Infantry Regiment and the 117th Engineer Battalion from reserve to Hill 700. He also sent light 
tanks forward from the 75th Tank Battalion.83 Despite the reinforcements, the reinforced 
American counterattack was unable to dislodge the Japanese from the hill. The Japanese fortified 
the captured positions and brought forward anti-aircraft guns to fire directly onto American 
infantry. On March 10 the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 145th Infantry Regiment were able to push 
the Japanese back and received additional support when soldiers from the 37th Reconnaissance 
Troop arrived. However, the bloody struggle for Hill 700 was not yet finished. 
 On March 11 the Japanese 23rd Infantry Regiment, part of the infamous 6th Infantry 
Division, continued the fight for Hill 700 with battalion sized banzai attacks. The exhausted GIs 
held firm after three days of continuous fighting.84 The Japanese had managed to establish 
interlocking fields of machine gun fire in uphill positions that fired down on American 
counterattacks and disrupted the main American supply line to Hill 700. Casualty evacuation 
remained difficult as tanks, armored cars, and the 2nd Battalion of the 148th Infantry Regiment 
were dispatched to assist.85 The 2nd Battalion was delighted when they were introduced to the 
bazooka, which some men described as being “more fun than a barrel of monkeys.”86 Continuous 
counterattacks finally managed to dislodge the Japanese from Hill 700. Gerald Shaner, 2nd 
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Battalion, 148th Infantry Regiment, recaptured one of the final bunkers. Shaner was awarded a 
Silver Star for his heroic actions.87 Japanese prisoners later reported that the 6th Infantry Division 
was essentially annihilated.88 The 37th Infantry Division was able to repulse the Japanese in their 
first defensive action of the war and thereby protect the American beachhead.  
 Division historians best described the battle for Hill 700 when they stated: “at no time in 
their campaigns in the Pacific did the 37th Division meet enemy soldiers equal to those in valor 
or ability” – a sentiment also expressed by Beightler.89 The defense of Hill 700 cost the GI’s 184 
killed, 1,304 wounded, and four missing.90 However, the citizen soldiers had little time to 
celebrate. Captured Japanese documents and prisoner information revealed that the 13th and 23rd 
Infantry Regiments were to join the 45th Infantry Regiment, the Magata Detachment, for an 
assault on the 129th Infantry Regiment’s sector.91 
  The objective of the Japanese assault was to attempt again to split the American line. 
General Beightler attached elements of the 131st Engineer Battalion, 32nd Chemical Mortar 
Battalion, and several tanks from the 754th Tank Battalion to the infantry to bolster their defense. 
The terrain was favorable for American artillery as it pounded the flat area of advance. The 136th 
Field Artillery fired so many shells during this battle that the adapter plugs became stuck in 
many of the guns.92 Additionally, the 37th Infantry Division artillery units always kept one gun 
loaded to respond with immediate counterbattery fire, thus preventing Japanese artillery from 
having any significant effect. The effectiveness of American counterbattery fire was exemplified 
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by a prisoner report that “enemy field artillery was reported by a prisoner to be unable to fire, as 
there were no personnel left, and most of the guns were destroyed.”93 Corporal Arthur Davidson 
further aided the artillery by turning captured Japanese knee mortars into flare projectors – an 
adaption adopted across the division.94 The Japanese assault found initial success, just as it had 
on Hill 700, with the seizure of seven pillboxes. Japanese infantry penetrated approximately 50 
yards into the American line with heavy mortar and machine gun support, but their advance 
rapidly stalled.  
It became readily apparent to the Japanese that soldiers with suicidal anti-tank lunge 
mines were ineffective against American infantry-tank tactics. Additionally, the Japanese force 
was simply too weakened from the battle for Hill 700. The Japanese assault was dealt a critical 
blow when captured documents informed Lieutenant Colonel Demas Sears, the Division G-2, 
where the Japanese headquarters was located – the 135th Field Artillery promptly disposed of it.95 
On March 24 the Japanese under Colonel Magata launched a final assault with the men that 
remained from the tatters of various Japanese units. This attack proved catastrophic for the 
Japanese because Beightler was able to secure 15,000 precious artillery rounds from Major 
General Griswold prior to the assault.96 The assault foundered due to the massive American 
firepower, and on March 27 the remnants of the Japanese forces retreated, marking the end of the 
Japanese offensive efforts. The Japanese on Bougainville, even though they still occupied the 
vast majority of the island, were now completely cut off from their homeland. The crack 6th 
Infantry Division was no longer combat effective and the American airfields were secured. 
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Beightler’s staff described the battle as one in which “wherever our troops met the Japanese 
quarter was neither given nor expected.”97  
A variety of factors made the American victory on Bougainville possible. The 117th 
Engineer Battalion created a two-way road system along the length of the perimeter that allowed 
for the rapid deployment of reserve forces, distribution of supplies, and recovery of casualties. 
The 37th Signal Company established so many communication channels that it was incredibly 
rare for a unit not to have contact with division headquarters.98 This constant communication 
with the frontline was a hallmark of Major General Beightler’s command, a product of the early 
training days at Camp Shelby. If Beightler was not at the front line he wanted to know exactly 
what was occurring there. These factors, combined with the logistical and American firepower 
superiority, made victory possible. However, victory was only achieved through the sacrifice and 
valor of the infantrymen. Beightler’s summation of the battle displayed his pride in the division: 
“one-time farmers, factory-workers, miners, and office men from America have out-scouted, out-
maneuvered, out-fought, and above all, out-lived the best the Japanese had been able to throw 
against them – and on ground of the Jap’s choosing.”99 
 The aftermath of the major battle for Bougainville consisted of what became known as 
the “three Ps” to the Buckeyes: pursuit, patrol, and police.100 The most significant of these 
activities were the patrols. Colonel Lawerence White, commanding the 148th Infantry Regiment, 
formed a special unit known as the “White Butai” that conducted several missions to destroy 
enemy forces. The result was over 400 slain enemy combatants at the cost of twenty-six friendly 
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casualties.101 General Beightler and his regimental commanders believed these patrols were 
critical for replacements to earn combat experience for the next campaign. The artillery units 
also had the opportunity to provide replacements with experience, especially new forward 
observers, because they maintained bombardment on the Japanese in the Upper Laruma River 
Region. The combat experience gained through these actions proved invaluable in the division’s 
next action on Luzon.  
 Beightler and his staff spent significant time evaluating their experience on Bougainville. 
Overall, they found that “the principles and doctrines taught in the General and Special Service 
Field Manuals were found to be sound” and should continue to be emphasized and expanded 
upon.102 The biggest emphasis was on getting replacements into reserve units to provide them as 
much experience as quickly as possible. Sometimes replacements were used to unload ships 
when they arrived, which Beightler now forbade. They also found that the best way to attack the 
Japanese was as quickly as possible. If the Japanese were able to establish defensive positions, as 
they did on Hill 700, then it became quite difficult to remove them. This lesson likely influenced 
Beightler’s decision to progress rapidly in the Cagayan Valley on Luzon. The American defense 
on Bougainville also demonstrated the importance of infantry-tank action and engineer 
battalions. The counterattacks conducted with tanks, such as one Beightler led at Cox Creek, 
were only able to be executed because of armor. The after action report viewed tanks, in a 
defensive operation, as a form of mobile defense that allow for potent counterattacks and 
emphasized that they should not be used as “stationary pillboxes.”103 The defense of Hill 700 
only succeed because of the roads and paths made by the 117th Engineer Battalion. The ability to 
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rapidly shift forces and material prevented the Japanese from exploiting their breakthroughs and 
allowed for armor to navigate through the jungle.  
 For the 37th Infantry Division, the aftermath of the fighting on Bougainville became a 
monotonous routine of patrols and training, which quickly turned to boredom. The 117th 
Engineer Battalion became known as the “Highway Department” during this time for its 
extensive efforts to create an effective road system. The arrival of fresh food, mail, and 
especially beer, helped to raise morale. However, morale was dealt a severe blow when the 
promise that the men would receive rest in New Zealand was broken. This occurred because the 
37th Infantry Division was transferred from the command of Admiral Halsey and Major General 
Harmon to General Douglas MacArthur’s Southwest Pacific command, principally because 
MacArthur lacked sufficient manpower in his quest to liberate the Philippines.  
 Another reality for Beightler was that he was passed over for promotion in favor of less 
experienced generals. He remained a division commander even as Generals John Hodges 
(Americal Division), Joseph Collins (25th Infantry Division), Frank Sibert (6th Infantry Division), 
and Innis Swift (1st Cavalry Division) all received promotions.104 All of these Regular Army 
commanders, with the exception of Hodges, were less experienced than Beightler. Despite his 
disappointment, Beightler had little time to protest as he prepared the 37th Infantry Division for 
its next action.  
 By this time in the war the front had moved past the Solomon Islands. The next target for 
the Buckeye Division was to be the Philippines. Beightler appreciated the fact that every island 
closer to Japan would be contested by an enemy fighting with ever increasing desperation. From 
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May through December 1944 the 37th conducted a massive, three-phase training program.105 The 
first phase focused on infantry assault teamwork, while the second phase was on tank-infantry 
training. The culminating phase was amphibious training. Training also emphasized specialist 
weaponry such as flamethrowers and bazookas. This training was based partially on the 
division’s experience on Bougainville, when some soldiers were learning how to operate the 
bazookas for the first time in combat situations. Additionally, new 155mm howitzers were 
provided to the artillery units to help replace their battle-worn machines.  
The 117th Engineer Battalion constructed six ranges with complete replicas of Japanese 
fortifications to practice assault tactics. Beightler allowed for company commanders to have free 
decision-making based on objectives and also provided them with combat support auxiliaries 
such as engineers and anti-tank units.106 Beightler always expected his officers to adapt and 
effectively use resources to spare men. The tank-infantry coordination in these maneuvers 
proved to be critical in the later campaign on Luzon. The infantry learned the benefits and 
limitations of tanks; they especially found communications with tank crews difficult. Armor was 
effectively used throughout the Bougainville campaign, especially in counterattacks, and was to 
be critical on Luzon as well. The amphibious training emphasized the importance of 
communications and rapid deployment during beach landings. Beightler and his staff critically 
evaluated each exercise and rectified any issues they came across. For instance, they found that 
the cargo slings on several transports were unable to lift the heavy 155mm howitzers.107 
Desperately needed replacements and equipment also arrived during this time. The 112th Medical 
Battalion received new ambulances and the 37th Reconnaissance Troop was provided M5 
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“Stuart” light tanks. The most important addition was the new erector-type Bailey bridges that 
were essential in spanning the rivers on the eventual drive towards Manila. However, all of this 
equipment and training failed to answer the question on every Buckeye’s mind: what was next? 
A critical point from the Bougainville after action report was that “all assaults must necessarily 
take into account that the Jap, no matter how hopelessly outnumbered or outmaneuvered, 
habitually fights until he is killed.”108 The 37th Infantry Division would soon learn again just how 
accurate that assessment was. 
Philippines: Lingayen Gulf to the Cagayan Valley 
 By mid-October 1944 Beightler learned that the division was to participate in the 
invasion of Luzon as an element of the Sixth U.S. Army. Originally the division was supposed to 
land on Leyte and Mindanao; however, Mindanao was bypassed and Leyte fell to XXIV Corps 
before the division was needed. MacArthur ordered the 37th Infantry Division to enter the fight at 
Lingayen Gulf.109 Its objective was Manila, the capital of the Philippines. In what was to be one 
of the largest amphibious operations in history, the 37th Infantry Division was designated to be 
the center of the landing force. The Buckeyes assumed the battle for Luzon would be Tarawa-
like in its ferocity. The division history related the mood was one in which the GIs “increased 
their churchgoing and wrote semi-goodbye notes to their wives and sweethearts.”110 The battle-
tested infantrymen of the 37th Infantry Division knew they were shipping out when they received 
oranges at breakfast in mid-December 1944.111 Their sea voyage proved monotonous as usual, 
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although a brief stop at Seeadler Harbor in the Admiralty Islands provided some relaxation. On 
January 8, 1945, the men received ammunition and final church services were held. 
 
The Invasion of Luzon112 
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 General Tomoyuki Yamashita, the respected “Tiger of Malaya,” led the Japanese forces 
in the Philippines. His force on Luzon consisted of the 8th, 10th, 103rd, 105th Infantry Divisions, 
the 58th and 61st Mixed Brigades, the experienced 2nd Armored Division, and a number other 
units.113 The 19th and 23rd Infantry Divisions also arrived as reinforcements. The Japanese 
defense was carried out in the absence of significant air strength. The American 3rd and 7th Fleet 
carrier strikes had decimated Japanese aircraft on Luzon and American land-based aircraft were 
deployed on Leyte and Morotai to assist in maintaining air supremacy over the island.114 The 
effectiveness of these attacks led Lieutenant General Muto, Yamashita’s chief of staff, to 
conclude that there was no realistic ability for the Japanese to contest American airpower.115  
However, Japanese kamikaze attacks proved to be capable of significant destruction and were 
psychologically devastating. Combined Task Force (CTF) 79, which carried the Buckeye 
Division to the beach, suffered damage to eleven ships from kamikazes and eight from explosive 
boats or hand placed charges during the first two days of landings.116 CTF 79, carrying the 
supplies and approximately 28,000 men of the 37th Infantry Division, lost 720 sailors in the first 
five days of the invasion.  
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37th LVTs Landing at Lingayen Gulf117 
 
D-Day + 1 at Lingayen Gulf118 
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 The beginning of the end of World War II for the 37th Infantry Division commenced at 
0445 hours on January 9, 1945.119 The guns of the 3rd and 7th Fleet pounded the shores of Luzon 
as U.S. aircraft flew overhead. The 129th and 148th Infantry Regiments landed at 0930 hours on 
Crimson and Yellow beaches.120 The landing was essentially uncontested as the Americans were 
greeted onshore by a number of Filipinos. The 148th Infantry Regiment quickly seized Binmaley 
and the crossed the Calmay River in the afternoon in the wake of the 129th Infantry Regiment.121 
The 145th Infantry Regiment landed the next day and was designated as division reserve. The GIs 
were surprised when they encountered only sporadic resistance and by the American-friendly 
atmosphere of many towns. The division had only fought in jungles and had not received any 
rest in a civilized location during the war. Being greeted as liberators was a welcomed 
occurrence to the Americans as they swiftly advanced towards Manila. The advance was so rapid 
that the artillery units struggled to maintain pace with the infantry – which Beightler remedied 
with an increased use of air strikes.  
 The division encountered its first significant problem on January 16 when it realized that 
twenty-one bridges on the thirteen-mile road from Camiling to Paniqui were all heavily damaged 
or destroyed.122 The downed bridges were largely a self-inflicted wound. U.S. aircraft destroyed 
several bridges, especially near the Agno River, before the Lingayen landings because 
intelligence officers feared a rapid Japanese counterattack against the beachhead.123 Despite the 
blown bridges, Beightler was pleased with the pace at which his division was moving; however, 
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there were some significant growing concerns. The division was now seventy miles from the 
beach with a relatively exposed left flank, and the 40th Infantry Division reported significant 
enemy contact on the right flank.124 Beightler assigned the 129th Infantry Regiment to protect the 
exposed flank and the main supply route but was soon forced to re-task it to seize Clark Field, 
Fort Stotsenburg and its nearby high ground. He also assigned the 145th Infantry Regiment, 
minus its 3rd Battalion, to take part in the operation.  
The American advance on Clark Field and Fort Stotsenburg, which began on January 28, 
immediately encountered significant Japanese artillery fire and mines of endless variety. The 
117th Engineer Battalion removed 1,349 mines before the battle was over.125 The Buckeyes were 
able to dig in around the runways by nightfall and repelled a Japanese counterattack that evening. 
Company I of the 129th Infantry Regiment took substantial casualties when six Japanese tanks 
engaged the unit. Fortunately, the 745th Tank Battalion and 637th Tank Destroyer Battalion 
arrived just in time to assist the infantrymen and save what remained of the company.126  
The Japanese were heavily entrenched in the nearby hills, and it was only through the 
thoroughly drilled tank-infantry tactics from Bougainville that the 37th Infantry Division was 
able to accomplish its mission. Lieutenant General Walter Krueger personally raised the 
American flag on Fort Stotsenburg on January 31. The cost for the division was more than 350 
casualties in exchange for nearly 800 Japanese killed and a significant amount of heavy 
weaponry captured or destroyed.127  
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Infantry-Tank Tactics at Clark Field128 
 The arrival of the 1st Cavalry Division at Lingayen Gulf on January 27 marked the 
beginning of the race to Manila – the sole objective of both divisions. The 37th Infantry Division 
began its movement down Highway 3 with the 148th Infantry Regiment leading the column while 
the 1st Cavalry proceeded southward on Highway 5. General MacArthur and Major General 
Beightler encountered one another on the highway, where MacArthur conveyed to Beightler that 
he wished to see the 37th Infantry Division take Manila first. This was a remnant of the old bond 
Beightler and MacArthur shared from their World War I days with the Rainbow Division. 
General MacArthur was the division chief of staff, while Beightler was a battalion adjutant for 
the 3rd Battalion, 166th Infantry Regiment. However, the reality of the situation heavily favored 
the 1st Cavalry Division. It was a mechanized tank-tipped spearhead that did not need to cross 
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nearly as many rivers. Despite their disadvantages, Beightler’s men believed they could and 
would beat the 1st Cavalry Division to Manila.  
 The first step to this objective was the seizure of Plaridel, a city twenty miles north of 
Manila at which Highways 3 and 5 merge. The 37th Infantry Division reached Plaridel first and 
encountered an entrenched Japanese garrison that consisted of five reinforced companies. The 
division overcame their first experience with street combat with relative ease; however, their 
advance was halted at the Pampanga River. The Sixth Army engineers did not provide the 37th 
Infantry Division with enough bridging material to cross the river, which forced the 117th 
Engineer Battalion to improvise.129 This delay allowed the 1st Cavalry to reach Manila first. 
Beightler and his GIs viewed this shortfall as yet another slight against National Guardsmen, but 
the allocation of bridging material between the 37th Infantry Division and the 1st Cavalry 
Division was no doubt based on the number of vehicles in each organization.  The 37th Infantry 
Division reached the outskirts of Manila on February 6 after covering approximately 160 miles 
from Lingayen Gulf. The men immediately made use of beer supplies left at the Balintawak 
Brewery – there was no trouble finding volunteers to guard the position. Despite this brief 
respite, the ensuing battle for Manila proved to be the most costly single engagement for soldiers 
of the Buckeye Division of the entire war.  
 The Japanese defenses in Manila consisted of interlocking fields of fire in heavily 
fortified buildings on essentially every street with minefields, pillboxes, and trenches throughout 
the city. The Japanese force in Manila consisted of elements from the 41st Army, known as the 
Shimbu Shudan, under the command of Lieutenant General Shizuo Yokoyama, and the Manila 
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Naval Defense Force under Rear Admiral Mitsui Iwabuchi.130 They possessed nearly 20,000 
troops and the support of a small number of pro-Japanese Filipinos, known as the Makapili.131 
The Japanese strategy was to situate a screening force north of the Pasig River while establishing 
defenses in the northern sector of the city.132 Beightler’s division advanced with the 145th 
Infantry Regiment on the right flank and the 148th Infantry Regiment on the left flank, while the 
1st Cavalry Division assaulted the city on the division’s left flank. The 11th Airborne was also 
approaching Manila from the south. The liberation of Bilibid Prison on February 3 filled the 37th 
Infantry Division with pride and anger as horror stories of the treatment of American prisoners of 
war permeated the ranks.  
 Shortly after this triumph, the 37th Infantry Division encountered the first significant 
Japanese resistance. The Japanese had set fire to many structures and the flames were too intense 
for the GIs to proceed through. Company K, 3rd Battalion, 148th Infantry Regiment, led by 
Captain Labin Knipp, was flanked by burning buildings as it attempted to seize the Jones Bridge 
to cross the Pasig River. Under intense enemy fire, Captain Knipp ordered the withdrawal of his 
company and stood in the intersection to suppress the enemy forces and lay down smoke 
grenades. He was wounded in the stomach as he assumed command of the rear guard and was 
the last man of his company to retreat from the bridge.133 Courageous acts such as this, 
exceptional leadership, and ubiquitous firefights characterized the 37th Infantry Division’s battle 
in Manila.  
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 As the division advanced into northern Manila, Beightler tasked the 145th Infantry 
Regiment with seizing the Tondo District. The regiment encountered significant fire from 
Japanese artillery, heavy mortars, and even naval guns.  The original Japanese strategy was to 
utilize the Polo-Dampalit area near Manila Bay to protect their forces from an American 
amphibious assault. However, this assault never materialized, so the Japanese attempted a 
breakout. They encountered the 3rd Battalion, 145th Infantry Regiment along Highway 3. The 3rd 
Battalion was able to halt several Japanese counterattacks before Beightler had them relieved by 
the 2nd Battalion on February 5.134 The Japanese force was significant; it contained four 
battalions along with some other ad hoc units. Beightler’s strategy to deal with the Japanese 
breakout was centered on protecting his outnumbered force. The GIs were to contain the 
Japanese pocket rather than engage it until reinforcements arrived to provide a sufficient force to 
eliminate the Japanese.135  
 Beightler assigned the Regimental Anti-Tank Company and some other units of the 145th 
Infantry Regiment to block the Talitip area, thus trapping the Japanese.136 He then reinforced the 
assault with the 3rd platoon of the Regimental Anti-Tank Company and a medium tank platoon. 
A determined foe awaited the Buckeyes in unfavorable terrain laden with flooded fishponds and 
steep riverbanks. The first attempted advance proved too costly, with nearly 200 casualties as the 
American force had to withdraw.137 A second attack, reinforced with an engineer platoon, 
achieved better progress. Although the destruction of the Japanese pocket was ongoing, the 145th 
Infantry Regiment was desperately needed in the battle for Manila.  
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 As the 37th Infantry Division prepared to enter Manila they were greeted with near 
constant artillery and mortar fire while Japan rockets screeched overhead – a new weapon 
encountered by the GIs. The Buckeyes possessed excellent artillery; however, orders from 
General MacArthur, who wanted to limit infrastructure damage to Manila, severely limited its 
use. The Guardsmen looked on helplessly at night as the sky glowed from the illumination of 
burning buildings – it was apparent the Japanese intended to destroy the city. It was not until 
February 7 that the winds shifted so that the fires were reduced enough for the infantry to 
advance. The first divisional unit to enter the heart of Manila was the 117th Engineer Battalion, 
attached to the 148th Infantry Regiment, through the Santa Cruz District. The 3rd Battalion of the 
148th Infantry Regiment led the assault across the Pasig River.  
 Major General Beightler continuously protested General MacArthur’s order limiting 
American artillery usage in Manila. Despite the reduction of significant artillery support, the 
148th Infantry Regiment crossed the Pasig River at 2010 hours on February 7.138 Major General 
Beightler again displayed his leadership by placing himself at the front of his advancing 
infantrymen to direct the attack under intense artillery and mortar fire – leadership for which he 
eventually received the Distinguished Service Cross.139 The 112th Medical Battalion’s report best 
summarized the battle with the statement that “Manila south of the Pasig was a fantasia of death 
and destruction.”140 
 Once across the Pasig River, the 37th Infantry Division came into contact with heavily 
fortified Japanese forces at the Paco Railroad Station. The 300 man strong bastion was complete 
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with the typical stout Japanese fortifications as well as several 20mm guns and a 37mm gun.141 
The task of seizing the station was given to the 1st Battalion of the 148th Infantry Regiment and 
the engagement resulted in two men earning the Medal of Honor. Private First Class John Reese 
and Sergeant Cleto Rodriquez, two automatic riflemen, were credited with killing eighty-two 
enemy combatants, destroying a 20mm gun, and neutralizing a heavy machine gun nest – Reese 
was killed in the action.142 Their Medal of Honor citations stated: “The intrepid team, in two and 
a half hours of fierce fighting, killed more than 82 Japanese, completely disorganized their 
defense and paved the way for subsequent complete defeat of the enemy at this strong point.”143 
This engagement for the 37th Infantry Division resulted in 19 dead and 216 wounded, higher 
casualties than on any other day of the Luzon Campaign. However, the Buckeyes still managed 
to take the station and the nearby Paco School by February 10.  
While the GIs wrestled the Paco Railroad Station from the Japanese, the 1st and 2nd 
Battalions of the 129th Infantry Regiment were tasked with seizing Provisor Island. The initial 
assault proved disastrous; a subsequent attack on February 11, better supported by accurate 
artillery fire and reinforcements, succeeded. On this day the GIs also made a startling discovery 
when they uncovered hundreds of slain Chinese and Filipino civilians, victims of Japanese 
sabers, bullets, and bayonets.144 Beightler captured the effect on the division when he remarked 
that “the atrocities committed against innocent Filipinos have filled us with furious hatred.”145 
                                                          
141 Ibid., 12. 
142 Ibid., 14.  
143 Robert S. Beightler Papers, Box 5, File 12, Awards, Medal of Honor Citations, 1943-1946, Official Citation for 
Cleto Rodriguez and John Reese.  
144 37th Division Histories, Robert S. Beightler Papers, Box 1, File 14, chapter 36, 21. 
145 Minuteman: The Military Career of General Robert S. Beightler, 125. 
Webb 50 
 
 By February 14 tanks and tank destroyers, accompanied by 105mm howitzers, advanced 
into the city to support the infantry with direct fire. Tanks proved to be incredibly effective in the 
urban warfare as combined infantry-tank tactics repeatedly prevailed. The 6th, 135th, 136th, and 
140th Field Artillery Battalions provided accurate indirect fire; however, close direct fire was 
more effective against urban buildings. The 148th Infantry Regiment used this new source of 
firepower in the seizure of the Philippine General Hospital, where the Japanese had taken several 
thousand civilians as hostages. The regiment liberated nearly 5,000 civilians and secure most of 
the hospital.  
 The carnage in Manila up to this point forced MacArthur to lift many of the restrictions 
he had previously imposed on American artillery. The 1st Battalion, 145th Infantry Regiment 
seized the New Police Station, another Japanese stronghold. The 145th Infantry Regiment also 
seized several other key buildings, including a particularly intense battle for City Hall. As the 
battle for Manila dragged on, units were beginning to weaken from the continuous action. 
Company I lost two company commanders and was down to only eighty men after the City Hall 
engagement.146 Additionally, the regiment lost two battalion commanders – Lieutenant Colonels 
Richard Crooks and George Coleman – both close friends of Beightler.147 However, the 
significant task of seizing Intramuros, a colonial Spanish fortress, was still ahead. Beightler and 
his staff devised an exceptional strategy for assaulting the stronghold that again displayed his 
deep care for the lives of his men. 
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Tank Searching for Snipers in Manila148 
 
Ruins of the New Police Station149 
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The General Post Office150 
 The premise of the Intramuros plan was to assault the Japanese in multiple sectors to 
confuse their communications and thus their defense. Lieutenant Colonel George Woods, 
commanding officer of the 3rd Battalion, 129th Infantry Regiment, established the tone of the 
operation with his statement about Intramuros’s walls and architecture: “It’s made of rocks and 
stone, forty feet thick at the bottom and twenty feet thick at the top. It’s filled within winding 
passages, ancient dungeons, and countless hidden recesses and it’s going to be up to you men to 
clean the Nips out of there.”151 The assault began on Intramuros on February 23 with an hour of 
artillery bombardment. However, this use of artillery displeased General MacArthur – as it did 
throughout the battle of Manila. A few days prior to the attack on Intramuros, Beightler was 
accused of unnecessarily destroying the city with his heavy use of artillery. General MacArthur 
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had previously ordered the 37th Infantry Division to be restricted to using 37mm guns at the 
largest.152 Beightler, knowing that his men were already suffering heavy casualties, refused the 
order, stating that he “would rather be relieved of command than carry out that order” and 
expected to be removed shortly thereafter.”153 MacArthur dispatched his Chief of Staff, Lt. 
General Richard Sutherland, to discuss the issue, and Beightler was able to convince him that the 
artillery fire was needed.  
 
The Intramuros Operation154 
After the bombardment a thick smoke screen was laid down by mortars as the 2nd 
Battalion, 145th Infantry Regiment stormed a hole in the wall blown near the north gate while 
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and the 3rd Battalion, 129th Infantry Regiment was brought in by assault boats over the Pasig 
River.155 During the assault General Beightler positioned his command post, which was 
subjected to occasional small-arms fire, in a hotel directly across the river to observe and direct 
the fight. Intramuros was largely seized by February 23, with Colonel Cecil Whitcomb’s 145th 
Infantry Regiment finishing off the Japanese garrison the following afternoon. The Intramuros 
operation was a resounding success. The 37th Infantry Division suffered twenty-five dead and 
265 wounded, but eliminated a 2,500 strong Japanese garrison and saved 2,000 civilians. Nearly 
half of the slain Japanese were casualties of accurate artillery fire.156 Brigadier General Clyde 
Eddleman, General Kreuger’s G-3, referred to the action as “one of the most beautifully 
conceived and perfectly executed plans I have ever known.” 157 Unfortunately, the division was 
unable to save all of the civilians held hostage in the Intramuros. Keith L. Barker recalled a scene 
while rescuing civilians in which “we knew why there had been tears behind these weak sad 
smiles. There were no Filipino men among the battered refugees. No fathers, brothers, husbands, 
and sweethearts. All had been murdered.”158 
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The Assault on Intramuros159 
 
The Women and Children who Survived Intramuros160 
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 The legislative, finance, and agricultural buildings were the last significant Japanese 
strongholds, with garrisons of around 700 men each equipped with machine guns, mortars, and 
37mm and 75mm guns.161 The battle for these buildings began on February 25 and continued 
until March 3. The assaults affirmed what the infantrymen already knew – the Japanese would 
fight to the last man. The legislative building took four days to seize and was the site where 
Medal of Honor recipient Cleto Rodriquez won a Silver Star for leading Company B in its 
assault on the complex.162 The costly battle for Manila finally ended when the finance building 
fell to the 3rd Battalion, 148th Infantry Regiment. The estimated Japanese dead in Manila totaled 
16,665 men, with 13,006 of them being credited to the 37th Infantry Division.163 The cost to seize 
the city was high, as the division suffered 3,732 combat casualties, 461 of them killed.164  
 The 37th Infantry Division was reassigned from XIV Corps after seizing Manila and 
placed under I Corps. The division’s new mission was to secure and establish order in Manila. 
The 145th Infantry Regiment and 135th Field Artillery were ordered to secure the city, the 148th 
Infantry Regiment and 140th Field Artillery secured the outskirts, and the 129th Infantry 
Regiment guarded bridges, conducted patrols, and manned outposts.165 A particularly difficult 
problem facing the men was determining if the Filipino collaborators turned into them had 
actually aided the Japanese. The Buckeyes found there simply was no definitive way to 
distinguish between a collaborator and non-collaborator.166 The GIs often found that those who 
turned in the “collaborators” were often taking out old retributions and settling personal debts. 
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Most of the civilian matters were relegated to Civil Affairs units.167 Overall, the task of 
peacekeeping in Manila was welcomed by the GIs, as replacements began to fill the depleted 
ranks. Men enjoyed themselves in ruins of the city and appreciated the lack of Japanese bullets 
and artillery constantly harassing them. The relaxation was short–lived, as all passes were 
cancelled on March 24 and the division prepared for yet another engagement.  
Mountain & Valley Shock Troops 
 The Japanese forces withdrew into the mountains in northern Luzon, where Yamashita 
intended to make his final stand. The 37th Infantry Division infantrymen now had to adapt to 
mountain warfare they had never trained for nor previously experienced. The next objective was 
Baguio, the summer capital of the Philippines. As the 129th Infantry Regiment progressed down 
the Naguilian-Baguio highway, also known as Route 9, they faced vertical cliffs to one side and 
dense jungle to the other. Additionally, Japanese artillery began to pour shells down from their 
positions on the high ground. The 66th Battalion of Igorots, Filipino soldiers from the 
mountainous areas of Luzon in the Cordillera region, engaged one of these positions only to lose 
nearly half of their men.168 These Japanese positions also killed Lieutenant Colonel Steward 
Brown, commander of the 6th Field Artillery, when a shell scored a direct hit on his forward 
observation post.169  
Major General Beightler had two options in proceeding down the treacherous highways 
in northern Luzon. He could either spread his regiments out and seize the high ground along 
Route 9 or proceed as a column. He decided on the latter approach and eliminated Japanese 
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pockets as he progressed. Beightler reasoned that the narrow front made more efficient use of the 
available limited artillery ammunition.170 As the 129th Infantry Regiment trudged through the 
mountainous highway, the 148th Infantry Regiment arrived to commence the assault on Baguio. 
The 129th Infantry Regiment was tasked with eliminating Japanese cave positions, which it did 
with demolition charges and direct fire from M7 “Priest” 105mm self-propelled guns. However, 
a precarious turn in the road known as “hairpin turn” had to be seized before the assault could 
commence. This portion of the road was home to several Japanese machine gun nests and a 
significant number of riflemen. Eventually the position was taken through combined tank-
infantry tactics once several medium tanks arrived. The training on Bougainville saved GI lives 
once again.  
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Steep Terrain of the Cagayan Valley171 
 On April 13, 1945, the 3rd Battalion, 148th Infantry Regiment commenced its assault on 
Baguio along with the 33rd Infantry Division and Filipino guerrilla regiments. For the next 
several days all the battalions of the 148th Infantry Regiment rotated in and out of the assault to 
drive the Japanese back until they reached the Irisan River on April 17. The terrain at this point 
was highly favorable to the Japanese, as their interlocking machine guns nests were shrouded by 
dense vegetation. Company B of the 754th Tank Battalion led the assault and encountered an 
                                                          
171 Ibid.  
Webb 60 
 
especially deadly banzai attack that seriously wounded Colonel Lawrence White – the most 
experienced regimental commander in the division.172  
The Japanese were well aware that retention of the Irisan Bridge was their best hope to 
prevent the American advance. Beightler’s offensive to seize the bridge entailed a two pronged 
attacked with the 2nd Battalion, 148th Infantry Regiment attacking from the north while the 3rd 
Battalion, 148th Infantry Regiment attacked from the south. The assault also had direct fire 
support from M-7 and M-18s from the 637th Tank Destroyer Battalion. The 2nd Battalion bore the 
brunt of the Japanese defense and Japanese artillery on the high ground shelled the Americans 
continuously, which reinforced Beightler’s decision to proceed with columns in the Cagayan 
Valley. GIs engaged in hand-to-hand combat against a staunch Japanese resistance that sought to 
maximize American casualties for each yard advanced. The bloodshed was compounded because 
American forward observers had difficulty finding the Japanese positions and cave fortifications, 
which were too strong for indirect artillery to do significant damage to them. This left numerous 
concealed and fortified Japanese positions untouched. Additionally, the division was running 
dangerously low on artillery ammunition.  
Beightler’s response was to greatly increase his use of air support. He did not use much 
air support on New Georgia and Bougainville – and in Manila it was prohibited. Beightler trusted 
airstrikes enough that by the end of the Baguio campaign he called strikes in as close as 400 
yards to friendly forces.173 Beightler encouraged pilots to visit the frontlines to understand the 
struggles of the infantry. As one pilot recalled after seeing his first slain enemy in person, “The 
                                                          
172 37th Division Histories, Robert S. Beightler Papers, Box 1, File 15, chapter 38, 18. 
173 Minuteman: The Military Career of General Robert S. Beightler, 207.  
Webb 61 
 
war down here is damn personal, isn’t it?”174 Beightler’s ability to adapt to combat conditions 
saved a significant number of lives and allowed for mission accomplishment as well.  
On April 19 a major artillery and aerial bombardment preceded the assault on “Chocolate 
Drop Hill.” The GIs displayed superb small unit tactics and eliminated twenty-five Japanese 
without a single casualty, thereby securing the high ground.175 Irisan Bridge was seized on April 
22, and thus the path to Baguio was open. 
 
M-7 Direct Fire at Baguio176 
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 The 129th Infantry Regiment replaced the 148th Infantry Regiment as the spearhead down 
Route 9 towards Baguio. Beightler unleashed a sortie of thirty-six P-51s, in combination with the 
155mm guns of the 6th Field Artillery, to soften Baguio. The city was seized on April 26 along 
with Trinidad to the north.177 In early May the 123rd Infantry Regiment of the 33rd Infantry 
Division relieved the 129th Infantry Regiment, only to be greeted by the sign, “You are now 
entering Baguio, courtesy 37th Infantry Division.”178 The 117th Engineer Battalion’s sign was 
taken down after a discontented commander expressed his feelings.  
 The 148th and 129th Infantry Regiments were now in reserve around Trinidad and Baguio; 
however, the 145th Infantry Regiment was still engaged at Mount Pacawagan. The engagement at 
Mount Pacawagan occurred simultaneously with the push across the Irisan Bridge and into 
Baguio. Mount Pacawagan was a significant portion of the Japanese “Shimbu line” in the 
Mariquina Valley. The Americans believed that the position was the most concentrated area of 
Japanese artillery, as the guns were fired from caves and withdrawn to negate counter-battery 
fire. Additionally, the Japanese garrison of 4,000 men possessed ample supplies to conduct a 
lengthy defense. Repeated assaults by the 1st and 63rd Infantry Regiments had failed to take the 
position, and they subsequently bypassed Mount Pacawagan. However, the fortifications created 
a salient in the American line and the artillery fire had to be silenced. On April 21, the 145th 
Infantry Regiment conducted a night offensive on the position. Progress was slow and bloody, 
but the 1st and 3rd Battalions had seized the southwest summit by the afternoon. 
 In only one day the 145th Infantry Regiment reached the summit of Mt. Pacawagan.179 
However, as the assault continued the progress slowed in debilitating heat and torrential 
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downpours. Eventually the 145th Infantry Regiment was able to seize nearby Hill 1521 and used 
bulldozers to make placements to deploy M7 howitzers, which finally offered much needed 
direct fire support. By May 2, Mount Pacawagan was in American hands, in addition to Mount 
Binicayan and Sugar Loaf Mountain. The twenty-five day campaign had reduced the 145th 
Infantry Regiment to just 1,566 GIs, with nearly 600 casualties and several companies down to 
just sixty men. But their victory secured three major mountains, eliminated the Japanese artillery 
positions, and ensured the protection of Manila’s water supplies.180  
 Rest continued to elude the 37th Infantry Division as the 148th Infantry Regiment was 
ordered to move on Balete Pass under attachment to the 25th Infantry Division. The Americans 
could not move into Cagayan Valley until the pass was seized. The 148th Infantry Regiment 
relieved the flanks of the 25th Infantry Division so that it was able to be concentrated directly up 
Route 5 into the pass. The first offensive action occurred after the repulsion of a Japanese banzai 
attack, after which the 3rd Battalion under Lieutenant Colonel Howard Schultz attacked Myoko 
Mountain. After two days the Japanese lines were broken, and Myoko Mountain was in 
American hands.  
 From this point the 148th Infantry Regiment was reattached to the 37th Infantry Division 
and received nearly 500 replacements who had been training with the 129th Infantry Regiment in 
reserve. In the coming days each regiment received at least 600 replacements and the training 
Beightler immersed them in allowed for successful integration.181 As Beightler and his men 
prepared for their advance into Cagayan Valley, they learned of the victory over Germany on 
                                                          
180 Ibid., 11.   
181 Ibid., chapter 42, 2. 
Webb 64 
 
May 8. To the Buckeyes, this was a world away, and the excitement was short lived as there was 
still a war to be won in the Pacific.  
 Cagayan Valley was the 260 mile long stronghold of General Yamashita. The Sierra 
Madre Mountains to the west and Cordillera to the east ran along the Mamparang and Palali 
ranges to the south. The Cagayan River provided yet another obstacle, although there were some 
relatively developed roads and towns in the region. Additionally, the Japanese still controlled 
positions on the high ground in several areas. During one patrol from the Division Artillery 
Headquarters Battery, Edgar Moorman and his comrades encountered a Japanese force hidden in 
a cave.182 The ensuing firefight to destroy the Japanese position became commonplace as 
American forces skirmished frequently throughout the valley. Yamashita possessed the 101st 
Infantry Division, the severely depleted 2nd Armored Division, the 103rd Infantry Division at the 
Aparri entrance to the valley, as well as several ad hoc units composed of the remnants from 
destroyed units.183 Major General Beightler requested to begin the attack earlier than originally 
planned to seize the momentum from taking Balete Pass. Lieutenant General Kruger approved 
this request, which ultimately proved to be an incredibly important decision.  
Yamashita’s later interrogation revealed that he intended to use two special units to 
destroy the Magat Bridge behind the 37th Infantry Division and then attack it with the 10th, 103rd, 
and 105th Infantry Divisions and the 2nd Armored Division.184 However, the 37th Infantry 
Division progressed much faster than Yamashita and his staff believed was possible. He had lost 
track of the division and believed it was impossible that they were in the Cagayan Valley 
because their last known location was at Baguio. Yamashita admired Beightler’s leadership and 
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stated, “When I speak of your tactics, I mean your boldness in concentrating your attack on a 
narrow front using all available fire power to blast a hole for your very aggressive infantry and 
the extreme effectiveness of the employment of artillery and air power to neutralize any forces 
on the flanks leaving the infantry free to exploit the advance. The close coordination of your 
armor and your heavy fire support with the infantry action, together with the most effective 
employment of close support aircraft that we had experienced, won my admiration and 
demonstrated the tremendous power of your attack. We weren’t ready for that type of fighting, 
and you beat us with it.”185   
A heavily reinforced 129th Infantry Regiment — with Company C, 775th Tank Battalion; 
Company B, 637th Tank Destroyer Battalion; the 37th Reconnaissance Troop; and two platoons 
from the 85th Chemical Battalion – moved through the Balete Pass.186 The 145th Infantry 
Regiment, with nearly 1,000 recently integrated replacements, and the 148th Infantry Regiment 
rejoined the division just prior to the first major encounter with the Japanese down the highway. 
The division progressed swiftly until reaching the outskirts of Solano on June 7, when it 
encountered significant Japanese anti-tank and artillery positions. The position was especially 
precarious because the 6th Field Artillery lagged behind the infantry because of the regiment’s 
rapid progress. The 145th Infantry Regiment suffered several casualties and lost two tanks to 
hidden 77mm Japanese guns and a 40mm cannon. Once the artillery was able to provide 
effective counter-battery fire, the Japanese positions were neutralized.  
Beightler frequently used P-51s to support the advance as his forces engaged more enemy 
tanks and heavy artillery. The veterans of the division dreaded every battle at this point, most of 
                                                          
185 Ibid. 
186 37th Division Histories, Robert S. Beightler Papers, Box 1, File 15, chapter 42, 3. 
Webb 66 
 
them had enough points to rotate home once the war was over. Private First Class Calm 
Wittebort, from Findlay, Ohio, was one of the very few original infantrymen left; he had 111 
points.187 However, because of the need for manpower and lack of shipping to send men home, 
he was still fighting in the jungles and mountains of Luzon.  
 Beightler’s strategy again used a column approach to advance through Cagayan Valley. 
On June 12 the 145th Infantry Regiment commenced its assault toward Appari down Route 5, 
while the 129th Infantry Regiment relieved the 148th Infantry Regiment along Route 4 just north 
of Bagabag. From this point on the roads turned from reasonably developed to treacherous 
mountain roads, some barely existing. Also, the division was overextended with vulnerable 
supply lines. This became blatantly apparent when the Japanese ambushed the 112th Medical 
Battalion and inflicted several casualties. By the time Company K from the 148th Infantry 
Regiment arrived, the Japanese unit had vanished.188 The Japanese were still masters of jungle 
warfare and the American drive down the valley was moving quickly, but on a narrow front. As 
one news correspondent stated, “the 37th Division, racing up the Cagayan Valley, has a front line 
200 miles long and 20 yards wide.”189  
The 37th Infantry Division continued its rapid progress up to Orioung Pass, which 
Beightler assumed the Japanese would defend. However, the Japanese had only just begun to 
fortify the position and what could have been another Balete Pass was taken in only three days. 
The rapid progress of the 37th Infantry Division had surprised the Japanese once again. On June 
16 the 145th Infantry Regiment, accompanied by an armored reconnaissance unit, captured a 
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massive amount of Japanese supplies, including seventeen trucks.190 The 148th Infantry Regiment 
took the lead and several days later reached the south bank of the Cagayan River. Once they 
crossed a bridge constructed by the 117th Engineer Battalion they stumbled into a strong 
mechanized Japanese position that consisted of eight tanks and nearly 200 infantry.191 However, 
the Americans surprised the Japanese again and the mechanized position was swiftly destroyed.  
The repeated inability of the Japanese to stall the American advance at fortified positions 
was the result of a failure to communicate effectively, a lack of supplies, and a failure to adapt 
their tactics to American capabilities. Beightler utilized his superior artillery and air power with 
flexible planning to achieve victory. In late June the 129th Infantry Regiment contacted the 511th 
Parachute Infantry on the outskirts of Appari. This meeting was especially important to Beightler 
because his son, Bob Jr., was a member of the unit.192 With this link the Cagayan Valley 
operation was complete. The 37th Infantry Division had progressed 260 miles from Balete Pass to 
Appari, thus essentially bringing an end to the Luzon campaign.193 Yamashita best summarized 
the 37th Infantry Division’s advance in the Cagayan Valley as one in which “no matter what we 
do, if you decide you are going to get in somewhere, you get there.”194 
Peace at Last 
 The 37th Infantry Division conducted mopping up operations for the duration of the war. 
The 129th Infantry Regiment proceeded into the Dummum River Valley region, while the 145th 
and 148th Infantry Regiments pushed into the Sierra Madre Mountains.195 The morale of the 
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division declined as men with a sufficient number of points to return home continued to risk their 
lives daily for trivial gains. The monotony of garrison life also plagued the division as the orders 
of the day consisted of ceremonies, patrols, and parades.  However, that all changed on August 
10 when the division learned of the impending Japanese surrender, and “hoarded whiskey bottles 
magically appeared and were rapidly consumed adding extra kick to an already hectic scene.”196 
The Japanese surrender became official on August 15, when a ceasefire was ordered and men on 
combat patrols rushed back to base with exuberant cheers. The war was finally over. 
 On September 2, 1945, General Yamashita, commander of the 14th Area Army, 
surrendered to American forces on Luzon. Major General Iguchi, commander of the 80th 
Brigade, surrendered his sword to Major General Beightler on September 4. The 37th Infantry 
Division was set to return home on September 25, although several complications delayed their 
well-deserved release from war. During this time Beightler had one last innovation left for his 
men. Each company elected one enlisted man to meet periodically with “the Old Man” to discuss 
anything and everything they ever had a problem with. This ranged from the lack of Coke 
products and being able to find a guitar to arguments about who should be heading home. For 
other soldiers the time was spent mourning those they had lost. Less than one-third of the 37th 
Infantry “Buckeye” Division at this point had seen any combat with the division.197 Many of the 
division veterans had few buddies left from New Georgia and Bougainville – some had none. 
The officers shared Beightler’s deep bond with the men they commanded. Captain Stanley 
Frankel captured this bond in his story, “Statistics Don’t Bleed,” in which he thought his mistake 
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cost six men their lives. He described the feeling of despair as one in which it would have been 
“better to have a few slugs in the gut than to live with this the rest of our lives.”198 
 Beightler maintained the division’s National Guard and Ohio roots; however, the 
division at the end of the war was nowhere close to the 44 percent of Ohioans it was on Fiji. 
Beightler assumed control of the Luzon Area Command until November 15, 1945. All elements 
of the division were heading back to the United States by November 26, and the 37th Infantry 
Division was deactivated on December 18, 1945.199 The 37th Infantry Division won its victories 
because of exceptional leadership, innovation, training, use of massed fire support, and courage. 
The division proved that National Guard units could be effective in combat and had helped the 
nation achieve victory. 
Major General Robert Sprague Beightler’s leadership was the key to the success of the 
37th Infantry Division. He had relieved incompetent leaders from command, regardless of their 
ties to Ohio or the National Guard. He had trained his soldiers intensively, both in the United 
States and overseas. Kruger rated Beightler as superb and one of his best division commanders, 
but he qualified this by stating “Beightler’s trouble was that he was a damn National 
Guardsmen.”200 Beightler continued to advocate for the National Guard after the war and 
oversaw the writing of the 37th Infantry Division’s history. He fought for the division to receive 
three battle stars instead of two, because he argued that the New Georgia and Bougainville 
operations should each be worth one. Beightler wanted his men to receive the recognition they 
deserved; he was proud of his men and what they had accomplished. Their victory cost the 
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Buckeyes 1,094 KIA and 5,960 wounded.201 Although the Buckeyes never received their third 
battle star, “the 37th Buckeye Division had achieved monumental immortality.”202  
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“It was not a short road, or a straight road, or an easy road. The toll charge for the trip 
was high. The cost for some was consummate; they never got to see the end of that road. 
Others paid with an arm or leg or eye or a bit of flesh and blood. For many the price was a 
set of haunted eyes and a deep, nauseating disgust. In one way or another everyone paid 
something.”203 
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